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On the Unity of “Continental Philosophy” 
It was in my capacity as a teacher of philosophy that I witnessed, in 2005, the 
creation of a new discipline within my department, a discipline called Continental 
Philosophy. In truth, I was more than a witness to this event. I protested it vociferously. 
Is it not incongruous, I asked, for a department of philosophy in continental 
Europe to characterize the philosophical approaches typical of continental Europe as so 
distinctive that they ought to constitute a separate branch of philosophy, or even a 
discipline unto themselves? Would not such a taxonomic maneuver be better suited to an 
American or British philosophy department? Would not introducing such a discipline 
merely escalate the old but still unofficial feud between “analytic” and “continental” 
philosophy, hardening it into a formal schism within philosophy? Finally, would not this 
change have the effect of relegating all of the department’s other research areas to the 
“analytic” domain, and so contribute still further to the hegemony of analytic philosophy 
in Scandinavia? 
In raising these worries, I found myself in an odd position. I was protesting the 
establishment of a new discipline, Continental Philosophy, not at all on account of that 
proposed discipline’s projected content – which was to include many of the texts and 
thinkers with which my own research is centrally occupied – but rather because the idea 
was to isolate that content from now on as “continental,” rather than to permit it (as, in 
my view, both the “analytic” and “continental” approaches should be permitted) to 
continue permeating all of the other traditional branches of philosophy, such as 
metaphysics, ethics, or logic. 
Soon my position grew stranger still. Just after I lost the debate within my 
department about establishing the new discipline, it emerged – ironically enough – that I 
was to be the faculty member charged with supervising it. Here I paused to take stock. Up 
to this point my teaching had ranged across the history of philosophy, from the ancients 
to the present. It was true that I had taken my degrees in France, where I had been lucky 
enough to have Gérard Granel as my mentor. It was also true that I had translated 
Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida and Agamben into Danish, my native language. But I had 
never before regarded the material that I had worked with, either as a student or as a 
translator, as belonging to a peculiar type of philosophy, let alone a type called 
“continental.” I regarded it simply as philosophy. What is more: while it is true that I am 
an admirer of the thinkers I have just listed, I am also an admirer of Austin and Kripke. 
Are not those two also representatives of philosophy, full stop? 
When I first assumed formal responsibility for the discipline of “Continental 
Philosophy” at Copenhagen, my starting task was to ask what should be regarded as the 
distinguishing mark of the philosophy typical of the European continent – and to consider 
what philosophy as a whole can learn from that kind of philosophy. These questions 
were, in the first instance, eminently practical: if Continental Philosophy was to be a 
discipline, it would need a unified, clearly demarcated subject-matter. 
But is such a demarcation even possible? Is there in fact any firm connection – let 
alone any unity – to be found among schools of thought as widely divergent as 
existentialism, phenomenology, the Frankfurt School, hermeneutics, and deconstruction? 
Certainly there is no ready-made category into which all of these schools fit. The term 
“continental philosophy” will hardly do, for though analytic philosophy has indeed 
defined itself as “analytic,” “continental philosophy” has never defined itself as 
“continental.” Historically, the term “continental” grew widespread only in the wake of 
analytic philosophers’ self-identification as occupied with the “analysis” of language, 
which they regarded as fundamental to the philosophical enterprise. (The decisive 
criterion was not the actual centrality of linguistic analysis to a thinker’s work – for if so, 
then a host of older thinkers, such as Augustine or Anselm, would count as analytic 
philosophers too – but the notion that the philosophical enterprise is centrally constituted 
by linguistic analysis.) In this early twentieth-century context, “continental philosophers” 
emerged as a mere placeholder for “the others.” The term “continental” had significance, 
at most, as a geographical designator. 
Today, however, there is more to say. After some reflection on my experience 
teaching these “continental” texts, I came to the view that there is in fact a determinate 
mode of philosophizing that can be associated with the European continent – though it is 
not definable in terms of any of the particular twentieth-century schools of thought listed 
above. The definition that is needed must be sought earlier in philosophy’s history. It is a 
definition that underlies the activity of all of the twentieth-century streams of continental 
thought, but which cannot be said to play as significant a role in the analytic tradition of 
Anglo-American philosophy. 
In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy we find a gap between 
continental and British philosophy that corresponds roughly to the divide between 
rationalism and empiricism. Today it is widely acknowledged that the latter divide was 
less stark than it once appeared. On certain decisive points, in fact, there was no essential 
difference between the two schools. Most fundamentally, both empiricists and rationalists 
asserted a basic split between the realms of matters of fact and relations of ideas, as in 
Hume, or between vérités de fait and vérités de raison, as in Leibniz. To be sure, there 
were important differences in how empiricists and rationalists respectively motivated 
these shared distinctions, but in the long run, it was this fundamental split shared by 
rationalists and empiricists, rather than the differences between rationalists and 
empiricists, that provoked nothing less than the great crisis that led Kant to critical 
philosophy. 
At the close of the eighteenth century and the start of the nineteenth, philosophy 
defined itself as transcendental philosophy (with Kant) and speculative philosophy (with 
Hegel). According to Hegel, every philosophical proposition is to be understood as 
speculative, whereas propositions that are not philosophical are to be understood as 
merely empirical. In philosophy, therefore, empirical objections do not qualify as genuine 
objections. For they overlook the fact that the empirical can only be understood by means 
of a process of reflecting on the empirical itself – which cannot itself be understood 
purely empirically. (Thus, for example, the fact that there are irrational human beings 
cannot be cited as a genuine objection to the definition of man as a rational being. On the 
contrary, the fact at issue is an observation that can only be made in light of the definition 
in question.) Similarly, in his “Transcendental Deduction of the Categories of Human 
Understanding,” Kant dismisses as merely psychological the empiricists’ efforts to 
deduce the same. Kant’s empiricist predecessors and contemporaries sought an account 
of how knowledge becomes possible in practice; but such an account cannot itself 
establish that that possibility will persist into the future. To deduce the conditions of the 
possibility of knowledge, Kant insists, one must reason not simply from what knowledge 
requires in practice, but from what knowledge requires in principle (though of course the 
latter can only be found in conjunction with the former). For both Kant and Hegel, the 
decisive condition lies neither in what precedes knowledge nor in what follows it, but 
rather in the movement from before knowing happens to after knowledge has been 
attained. Knowledge is precisely this movement. 
Thus it is that with Kant (and with Hegel) we find a decisive fissure in 
philosophy’s development. The same split that divides Kant’s precritical writings from 
his critical philosophy can also be detected in the gap between the philosophical methods 
typical of the British Isles and those typical of continental European thinkers. In the 
former sphere, the sharp distinction between the empirical and the rational was 
maintained unabated; in the latter sphere, philosophy’s main concern came to be with the 
connections and transitions between the two. Moreover, as continental thinkers focused 
ever more closely on the processual quality of knowledge, it became increasingly clear 
that philosophy would need not only to abandon its traditional distinctions between the 
ideal and the factical, or between the rational and the empirical, but ultimately to dispense 
with all of the fixed stances on which it had traditionally depended. In time, even the 
distinction between historical and systematic thinking would itself prove to be untenable. 
This is of course not to say that all “continental” philosophers are in agreement 
with Kant and Hegel. I do wish to point out, on the other hand, that even today, when so-
called continental philosophers defend their approaches to philosophy against “analytic” 
naysayers, they sometimes reach back to the distinction between critical and precritical 
philosophy introduced by Kant. A recent example is Derrida’s use of “pre-critical” in his 
1990 counteroffensive against the objections of John R. Searle.1
In the Anglo-American philosophical community, one often finds extraordinary 
expertise in Kant and Hegel on the part of historians of philosophy who do their work in 
isolation from – albeit in peaceful coexistence with – their systematician colleagues. This 
division goes unremarked, as though it were a wholly logical division of labor. The 
unfortunate result of this separation is that the historians’ work in transcendental and 
speculative thinking is kept from having any real impact on current developments in 
systematic philosophy (for one now merely “knows about” those philosophical 
approaches
 But there are also 
further, more wide-ranging consequences to consider. 
2). This phenomenon ultimately encourages unproductive characterizations of 
the difference between analytic and continental philosophy, particularly on the part of 
analytic philosophers who confine themselves to the historical matters of fact and never 
confront the deeper philosophical incompatibilities at issue.3 A common result is that 
attempts to unite analytic and continental philosophy, as for example in what are called 
“philosophy of mind” and “the cognitive sciences,” take forms that are even less 
congenial to continental thought than is existing analytic work.4
 
  
 
                                                 
1 See Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., tr. Samuel Weber et al. (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1988) 66; [Limited Inc. (Paris: Galilée, 1990) 127]. 
2 Another method is to relegate such knowledge and its representatives to the Departments of 
Literature, German or French, in order to be able to argue at a later point that this knowledge 
cannot be considered genuine philosophy because it is only to be found in the Departments of 
Literature, German, or French. For an example of this, see Barry Smith et al., “Revisiting the 
Derrida Affair with Barry Smith,” Sophia, 38, no. 2 (1999): 142–169. 
3 Peter Simons, in “Whose Fault? The Origins and Evitability of the Analytic-Continental Rift,” 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 9 (2001) 3: 295–311, attempts to explain the 
divide between continental and analytic philosophy in terms of such events as the two World 
Wars. Michael Friedman, in A Parting of the Ways. Carnap, Cassirer and Heidegger 
(Chicago: Open Court, 2000) offers a detailed summary of the disagreements among these 
three philosophers stemming from the 1929 Davos colloquium; this proceeds from the 
incorrect assumption that, up until that point, the figures in question were still speaking the 
same philosophical language.  
4 On this point see Chapter 1 of Miguel de Beistegui, The New Heidegger (London: Continuum, 
2001), and §2 of Martin Hägglund, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2008). 
